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the forms of historical development of nation-states and from the way pow-
er is organized within them. 
 
3. History meets the social sciences 
The critical sociology of Antonio Gramsci takes shape in the rejection not 
only of positivist Marxism but also of Benedetto Croce’s idealist philoso-
phy. As a theorist of bourgeois liberalism, Croce played in Italy the same 
role Hegel played in Germany (Salamini 1981, 27). The human and histo-
ricist components of Croce's philosophy become a useful conceptual tool 
for Gramsci in his criticism of the Marxist mechanicism of the Second In-
ternational. Although fascinated with Croce’s statement on the historical 
importance of human values, Gramsci clearly distances himself from the 
Italian philosopher on the question of the role actually played by the masses 
in the process of historical determination. Croce's idealism is in fact unable 
to resolve the conflicting relationship between theory and praxis. Accord-
ing to Gramsci, by raising the concrete reality of social conflict to the level 
of ideas, the philosophy of Bendetto Croce becomes an ideological appara-
tus that justifies the existence of abstract, purely speculative and essentially 
a-historica values. When meta-historical values are regarded as absolute 
values, then metaphysics and pure theory take the place of real conflicts 
happening among men. As Salamini observes (ibid., 28), Gramsci's criti-
cism of Croce's idealism can be summed up in four basic points: the con-
cept (and conception) of historicism, the definition of philosophy, the con-
ception of dialectics, and the relationship between theory and praxis.  
Gramsci and Croce seem to agree on the historical and immanent role of 
ideas as well as on their criticism of theories not grounded in historical 
facts, but Croce, unlike Gramsci, gives a metaphysical value to history. 
When Croce says that ideas generate action and that man is the real creator 
of history, he actually refers to a hypostatized, that is, not historically de-
termined, man (Croce 1907, en.tr. 1914; 1915). In Gramsci’s opinion, men 
are the protagonists of concrete struggles, which are structured into real his-
torical processes, by facing the objective reality of social contradictions. If 
for Croce historical creation is reduced to a history of ideas and concepts, 
Gramsci, like Marx, see historical processes mainly as praxis, that is, prac-
tical activity. Ideas become concrete in objective social conditions, and the 
history of science is not metaphysics, but a tool for creating historical con-
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sciousness (Gramsci 1977a). Historicism is therefore understood by Gram-
sci as a kind of awareness of the role of history as an instrument for action 
and mobilization. From this point of view Gramscian Marxism is absolute 
historicism in its aim to reveal the sociological context of ideological sys-
tems (Badaloni, 1967, 101). Even dialectics, in Croce's idealism, is reduced 
to a dialectic between innovation and conservation and, in this sense, it has 
an immediate political impact, even if it represents the absolute negation of 
conflict. According to Gramsci, the conception of dialectics assumes in 
Croce an ideological value in that it excludes any immediate revolutionary 
alternative. The reduction of the real historical dialectic to a conceptual di-
alectic minimizes the role of politics in favor of aesthetics, economics, log-
ic, regarded by Croce as true sciences. Politics, reduced to mere ideological 
passion and ideology, in Croce’ s view, is not philosophy. Croce’s classifi-
cation of pure sciences may be valid, according to Gramsci, only in an uto-
pian society, structurally and epistemologically unified, that is, in a class-
less society without conflicts, which, historically, is a non-sense. In socie-
ties characterized by dialectical conflicts between classes, political passion 
and ideologies become science. The history of philosophy is then, for 
Gramsci, the history of the conflict between alternative worldviews, and in 
this sense, philosophy itself becomes politics and the political science be-
comes the only science capable of resolving social conflicts (Gramsci, 
1977a).  
Gramsci's rejection of evolutionist bourgeois sociology does not dismiss 
the possibility of a sociology placed in the perspective of a philosophy of 
praxis (Gallino 1970; Pizzorno 1970). What Gramsci criticizes is not soci-
ology tout court but the ideological function of positivism and Croce's 
idealism. If sociology would give up the attempt to develop a system of ab-
solute, objective laws, it might give an essential contribution to the under-
standing of the origins and conditions of socio-cultural systems. In fact, 
every society has its own rationality that Gramsci does not deny. Thus, crit-
ical sociology is called upon to find this rationality and replace it with a 
system of rationality for the benefit of civil society. This is, therefore, a so-
ciology of political praxis, a science that analyzes the conditions under 
which subaltern groups are formed, crystallized and work within a given 
historical bloc. Specifically, it has to analyze the historical process of for-
mation of a given collective will (Buzzi 1969; Piotte 1970), starting from 
the awareness that the genesis of any social group is always characterized 
by a certain connection with the means of production, and that the end 
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point is always the political and cultural conquest of hegemony that is a-
chieved when a given social group becomes a unifying and leading force 
also for other social groups. In this regard, the acquisition of a historical 
consciousness, the development of a political and intellectual class, the cre-
ation of new political organizations and worldviews, are for Gramsci the 
most important superstructural elements in a sociological framework.  
At this point, Gramscian sociology coincides with Charles Tilly’s historical 
sociology. According to Tilly, the approaches of sociologists and historians 
to the analysis of social events are different, but there are good reasons to 
try to identify the parameters for a practical synthesis of the two approaches 
based on the need to develop historically grounded social theories. Such an 
effort necessitates our careful reflection on the merits of historical research. 
First, we should restore some conceptual order by affirming the importance 
of the work of historians. There have been, especially in sociology, scholars 
who expressed their conviction of being able to analytically capture social 
cases without knowing their historical origins, namely the specific contexts 
from which these cases emerged. This sociological effect is clear in the fol-
lowing words by Lipset: 
From an ideal-typical point of view, the task of the sociologist is to formulate general hypo-
theses, hopefully set within a larger theoretical framework, and to test them. His interest in 
the way in which a nation such as the United States formulated a national identity is to spe-
cify propositions about the general processes involved in the creation of national identities 
in new nations. Similarly, his concern with changes in the patterns of American religious 
participation is to formulate and test hypotheses about the function of religion for other insti-
tutions and the social system as a whole. The sociologist of religion seeks to locate the con-
ditions under which the chiliastic religion occurs, what kinds of people are attracted to it, 
what happens to the sects and their adherents under various conditions, and so on. There are 
clearly no problems of the historian. History must be concerned with the analysis of the par-
ticular set of events and processes. Where the sociologist  looks for concepts which subsume 
a variety of particular descriptive categories, the historian must remain close to the actual 
happenings and avoid statements which, though linking behavior at one time and place to 
that elsewhere, lead to a distortion in the description of what occurred in the set of circums-
tances being analyzed (Lipset 1968, 22-23). 
As Tilly (1981, 5) observes, the question of the division of labor between 
sociologists and historians, as placed by scholars such as Lipset, is essen-
tially similar to that «between the mycologist and the mushroom collector, 
between the critic and the translator, between the political analyst and the 
city hall reporter, between brains and brawn. History does the transcription, 
sociology the analysis». This is a clear mystification to which, it should be 
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said, historians have often contributed, as we can see from these words by 
Gareth Stedman Jones: 
Attitudes toward sociological theory among sociologically inclined historians have often 
verged on the credulous, and although more critical sociologists might have rejected as 
naively positivist any distinction between history and sociology which sees the one as “idio-
graphic” and the other as “nomothetic”, many of these historians have behaved in practice as 
if they considered such a division of labour to be legitimate. Defensive about their own sub-
ject and repelled by an inadequately understood Marxism which appeared to be the only 
other contender, they have looked uncritically to sociology as a theoretical storehouse from 
which they could simply select concepts most serviceable for their individual needs (Sted-
man Jones 1976, 300).     
History cannot be seen as a kind of failed sociology, as well as historical 
materials cannot be treated as raw evidence waiting to be sociologically 
analyzed. In this regard, Charles Tilly offers a double argument through a 
distinction between «matters of fact» and «matters of principle» (Tilly 
1981, 6). On a strictly factual ground, historians conduct their investiga-
tions following some rules that differ significantly from those governing 
social science research, as well as historical materials generally differ from 
those used in sociology. In terms of principle, it should also be said that any 
analysis of social processes is equally historical. In fact, an analysis is his-
torical only when it takes into consideration the time and the place of the 
action in his explanations. From this point of view, the classic distinction 
between “generalizing” (or nomothetic) and “particularizing”(or idiograph-
ic) disciplines is not adequate. Historical analysis must be characterized by 
the integration of time and space. It is mainly the sociological analysis of 
change on a large scale to have an insufficient historical awareness. There-
fore, sociological theory needs to be grounded in history, that is, embedded 
in time.  
Both sociologists and historians, while following partially different logics, 
cannot refrain from seeking more adequate theories to investigate historical 
and social contexts. To achieve a similar result we should further explore 
the terrain of history. As Tilly observes (ibid., 12), the word “history” re-
fers, at the same time, to a «phenomenon», to «a body of material» and to a 
«set of activities».  
As a phenomenon, history represents the cumulative effect of past events 
on present events. Let us think of the phenomenon of industrialization; 
scholars are divided between those who believe that the processes of capital 
accumulation, economic growth, exploitation of labor force, recur in a 
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number of countries, following more or less the same lines, and those who 
believe that these processes vary depending on the mode of industrializa-
tion of the countries that first initiated the dynamics of accumulation. Only 
the members of the first group can obviously adopt common procedures for 
synchronic comparison, since they assume the irrelevance of the temporal 
dimension; the members of the second group will avoid those forms of 
cross-sectional comparison, paying greater attention to the dynamics of his-
torical development. 
Seen as a set of materials, history appears as a persistent and residual body 
of past behaviors that can be brought to light through old news reports, wit-
nesses’ accounts, autobiographies and other narrative materials that may re-
present a small slice of past experience. Historians have generally focused 
primarily on written evidence, although any remnant of the past, from 
working tools to graffiti left on walls, can constitute a small fragment of a 
past life. 
Viewed as a set of activities, history is an attempt by scholars to reconstruct 
the past. An attempt that, according to Tilly (ibid., 13), is likely to be hope-
less for two reasons, which, after a little reflection, will actually appear ob-
vious. First, the availability of information on the past is likely to be almost 
inexhaustible, exceeding the effective capacity of even the most slavish his-
torian to collect and synthesize them in a comprehensive way. Historians 
are compelled to make a choice by selecting only a small portion of the ma-
terial available to them. Second, historians have to pick just a few of the 
many events occurred in the past, depending on the specific question on 
which the research design is built. Once the objectives of the survey are 
clearly defined, other information that is not closely related to them may be 
deemed irrelevant. In a few words, historical writing is based on the follow-
ing aspects: those who commit themselves to this work specialize in the re-
construction of past behaviors; they rely mainly on narrative texts that 
represent the remnants of the past; they emphasize only selected pieces of 
text taken as the most suitable means to perform the task of reconstruction; 
they consider “where” and especially “when” some specific events are re-
levant for their impact on social life, and may therefore constitute essential 
elements for their own explanation. The fact that the function of historical 
work is easily identifiable, does not mean it will always proceed according 
to an ordered pattern: 
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In reality, the practice of history resembles a zoo more than a herbarium, and a herbarium 
more than a cyclotron. In a Cyclotron a huge, costly, unified apparatus whirs into motion to 
produce a single focused result; history does not behave like that. In a herbarium, a classifi-
catory order prevails; each dried plant has its own niche. Historians divide their subject mat-
ter and their styles of thought into diplomatic, economic, intellectual, and other sorts of his-
tory, but the divisions are shifting, inexact … and often ignored in practice (ibid., 15-16). 
However, stating that historical practice is often methodologically inconsis-
tent and inaccurate, does not mean that historical processes are without 
meaning for the social sciences. Many social-scientific disciplines that have 
developed as if the historical origins of social phenomena were of no im-
portance – particularly anthropology, sociology and political science – feel 
the need of restoring their historical connections. In particular, sociology 
has long perfected its methods in opposition to history and, Tilly points out 
(ibid., 37), by placing itself outside the effort – typical of scholars of the 
nineteenth century – of understanding and controlling the origins and the 
features of industrial capitalism, an effort somehow shared by authors such 
as Marx, Tönnies, Durkheim and Weber. Previous sociologists were pri-
marily concerned to place historical experience within macro-sequences, 
such as Comte’s theory of the «three stages of thought» (theological, meta-
physical and positive), or Spencer’s «evolution theory», according to which 
humanity is engaged in a long historical march on the path of differentia-
tion from a «military stage» to an «industrial stage». With the development 
of sociological practice, especially during the twentieth century, the histori-
cal content of social processes was gradually dried up in the illusory at-
tempt to create a sort of natural (a-temporal) science of society. Only in the 
sixties and in particular the seventies of the twentieth century, eminent so-
ciologists would rediscover a taste for historical connections, especially in 
dealing with important issues such as industrialization, control of forms of 
rebellion and revolution, and family structure. A taste for historical and 
comparative analysis of large-scale processes of change began to spread 
among some social scientists, mainly because of some disappointment over 
the ineffectiveness shown by classical models of modernization and devel-
opment. 
Sociological analysis has often had to undertake the study of history when 
dealing with two areas: first, large-scale structural change, and second, col-
lective action with particular reference to the analysis of social movements, 
rebellions and revolutions. The search for general patterns for the processes 
of industrialization, rationalization or political development brings the 
scholars to make a double effort: on the one hand, they must identify the 
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traits of great processes of change in specific historical periods, and on the 
other, they must connect specific transformations that were taking place in 
those times to the macro-processes of change previously identified. The at-
tempt to formulate some general laws underlying revolutions or social 
movements, therefore, involves the need to find some regularities in collec-
tive action in specific historical periods. According to Tilly (1981, 44), in 
our time, the two macro-processes to consider are undoubtedly represented 
by the expansion of the capitalist system and the development of nation 
states (as well as by the resulting system of states). 
If we agree with this idea, the historical problem we have to face lies in the 
need to determine how and why processes of capital accumulation occurred 
with the resulting dynamics of proletarianization; how and why the system 
of production relations spread, and finally what consequences resulted from 
this expansion. The temporal element here is essential and historical analy-
sis indispensable. Moreover, there is the question of the nation state, un-
derstood as a complex organization in a position to monopolize the means 
of coercion in a specific territory. The nation state is autonomous, centra-
lized, and its lines of internal division are formally coordinated, making it 
different from other organizations working in the same area. From this 
point of view, States are a relatively new phenomenon, since we can detect 
their traces only in the past few hundred years. Even the international polit-
ical context, in Renaissance Europe, was largely characterized by formally 
independent political units, which were far from resembling the system of 
states typical of our times. Modern states can be historically analyzed both 
in their internal dimension, by focusing on the dynamics through which 
some organizations manage to exercise a certain domination over the popu-
lations of a given territory, gradually becoming a State, and in the external 
dimension, by observing how those organizations defend their domination 
against pressure from outside organizations (other States). In both dimen-
sions the question of War becomes crucial. Internally, war pushes rulers to 
exert heavy pressure on their people in terms of taxes, conscription and re-
quisitions; externally, it leads them to pursue war efforts through which 
they can affirm their right to exclusive control over a given territory. 
From this context, emerge the classic questions of political sociology that 
link Gramsci to Tilly: how can the ruling class maintain control over the 
economic life and the political apparatus in a given area? Under what con-
ditions can the population be active, organized and informed with respect to 
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national politics? How are riots, rebellions and revolutions enacted? And so 
on. In this way, we can take the asymmetries of power and participatory 
processes as a historical problem to be connected to the two macro-pro-
cesses represented by the development of states (and the systems of States) 
and the expansion of the capitalist system of production. As Tilly points out 
(1981, 46), state and capitalism provide the framework for a historically 
rooted analysis of collective action and of the ways by which individuals 
act together in pursuit of shared interests. «Instead of the eternal behavior 
of crowds, we study the particular forms of action that people use to ad-
vance claims or register grievances. Instead of laws of social movements, 
we study the emergence of the social movement as a political phenomenon. 
Instead of power in general, we study the modalities of power within a cer-
tain mode of production» (ibid.). In particular, the two macro-processes in-
fluence the direction of change by acting on three fundamental components 
of collective action: the “interests” for which individuals decide to act col-
lectively, their “capacity” to act in defense of those interests, and the “op-
portunity” to advance or defend those interests through the development of 
coordinated collective action. 
 
 
4. Historical comparison as a sociological instrument 
Antonio Gramsci’s historical sociology cannot disregard the use of compar-
ison as a privileged instrument of knowledge. As above mentioned, he is 
interested in understanding the reason why, in Italy, a revolution on the So-
viet or Jacobin model is impossible. His interpretation, the result of a care-
ful comparative analysis, can be ascribed to the role of intellectuals and to 
the structure of civil society. 
Gramsci distinguishes between organic and traditional intellectuals. The 
first are those whose origins coincide with those of the social group they 
wish to represent. They are defined according to the functions conferred on 
them by the social group from which they originate in economic and politi-
cal, as well as cultural and ideological spheres. Organic intellectuals repre-
sent a function of the interests of a class, but also an instrument of social 
transformation. Traditional intellectuals, on the other hand, seem to be the 
expression of an uninterrupted historical continuity. Their raison d'être is 
based on the autonomy of their past and on the need to reproduce their 
caste-like position in contemporary society. What really defines traditional 
